The world of archeology, neuroscience and philosophy are astir with the shock discovery in Athens that, by combining modern techniques of sound recording, echolocation, neuroscience, and educatedguessworkism, the original Platonic dialogues have been reconstructed in a form that actually displays the unspoken thought processes of the interlocutors as well as the written text.
Unfortunately, only a fragment has so far been processed. The following extract from Plato’s The Meno however shows great insight into the dialogic nature of philosophical discourse. Scholars hope it will shed new light on the psychology of philosophical debate and add to current debates about philosophical method.
Readers of this blog have an exclusive, world first preview:
Socrates. And so of the virtues, however many and different they may be, they have all a common nature which makes them virtues; and on this he who would answer the question, “What is virtue?” would do well to have his eye fixed: Do you understand? (Jeez, how simple do I have to make this for this loser?)
Meno. I am beginning to understand; but I do not as yet take hold of the question as I could wish. (fucking tosser; he’s doing this on purpose)
Socrates. When you say, Meno, that there is one virtue of a man, another of a woman, another of a child, and so on, does this apply only to virtue, or would you say the same of health, and size, and strength? Or is the nature of health always the same, whether in man or woman? (ha ha, I’m going to get this twat with this one)
Meno. I should say that health is the same, both in man and woman. (Okay, okay, another trick fucking question coming up.)
Socrates. And is not this true of size and strength? If a woman is strong, she will be strong by reason of the same form and of the same strength subsisting in her which there is in the man. I mean to say that strength, as strength, whether of man or woman, is the same. Is there any difference? (great, he’s taking the bait. Let’s see him wriggle out now)
Meno. I think not. (shit, there must be something I can think of in reply … crap, why does my mind always freeze over when this Socrates jerk gets going?)
Socrates. And will not virtue, as virtue, be the same, whether in a child or in a grown-up person, in a woman or in a man? (Bet this twat hasn’t read Wittgenstein or anything … there are so many obvious retorts to this idiotic question but I’ve made him feel so uncomfortable now he’ll never think of them in time, especially if I keep up this aggressive rhetorical questioning)
Meno. I cannot help feeling, Socrates, that this case is different from the others. (I’m sure that arsehole knows it is too, and he’s worked this all out before he even got here. Shit, why didn’t I check this out on the Stanford Encyclopedia before I came to this fucking seminar?)
Socrates. But why? Were you not saying that the virtue of a man was to order a state, and the virtue of a woman was to order a house? (I’m enjoying this now)
Meno. I did say so. (Bugger. Did I say that? I’m sure I didn’t mean it like that. Should I change my mind now? Or will I seem weak if I do that? Should I reply to his question with a question? How long til the drinks?)
Socrates. And can either house or state or anything be well ordered without temperance and without justice? (Going for the slow march to the scaffold now)
Meno. Certainly not. (Shit, is that X in the audience? Isn’t he on the shortlisting committee for that fucking job? Fuck. Fuck.)